Abstract. As the world was becoming more interdependent, with increased global awareness of the northernmost parts of the world, both the Norwegian and Russian governments showed more political commitment to and interest in new forms of region-building and development in the High North from 2006 and onwards. Today, more than ten years later, many regional changes are evident in the Norwegian-Russian border zone, as a consequence of expanded people-to-people contacts in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR). In this peripheral border area between two national states, villages and cities have become more open, both sociologically and legally for increased cross border cooperation (CBC) and networking. In this article I will take stock of some of these borderland openings following on from the consequence of the two nations' rising levels of interest in the High North. It explores the ways in which (inter-)national policymaking and state-substate interactions ultimately altered centre-periphery dynamics. This article has based its approach to understanding the interplay of domestic and foreign policy instruments on the 'substate diplomacy' literature, which argues that increased state-substate interactions constitute an efficient instrument for extending cooperation beyond national state borders. The efficiency of regionally driven substate interactions is discussed from an empirical perspective. The present study analyses various High North development contexts and discourses (effective from 2008) in the Arctic borderland between Norway and Russia. The new political commitments presented in state-level official documents (the branding of the High North) envisioned a transference of new industrial-economic high tech scenarios from state to local level. These scenarios included new borderland visa regimes, co-existing with cross-border forums investments in improvements of roads, infrastructure, and transport rationalisations. The present article briefly assesses these policy rationales and their outcomes, revealing the region's contemporary geopolitical and economical potential, as well as local and regional realities. The findings show that substate governments and stakeholders are able to operate in demanding trans-border contexts, contribute to ongoing contemporary CBC discussions, and complement national and state-level efforts by using their regional expertise to solve problems. 
Joenniemi P., Sergunin A.; 8, Jackson T.]. Since the earliest contributions, there is arguably now a more sophisticated and improved body of work on this topic: 'the spectrum of diplomatic instruments and the strategies that accompany them have become more diverse and complex' [9, Criekemans D., p. 1]. Authors have assumed that substate diplomacy is real, creating a new paradigm for dealing with international relations. Empirical studies have been dominated by analyses of the disintegration of traditional domestic and foreign policies and political centres. They have also explored periphery distinction: why regional state actors should 'go abroad', what impact substate involvement in international relations can have on traditional diplomacy; and in what ways substate actors can become involved in international relations. Comparative studies have also explored these issues. What types of competences do substate and state actors need? What types of juridical frameworks are available to substate actors when they 'go abroad'? Terms and names have also been thoroughly discussed (e.g. paradiplomacy, multileveled diplomacy, constituent diplomacy, and regional substate diplomacy). Discussions about theoretical approaches to paradiplomacy have been less enthusiastic. After surveying several book editions, Boyer [10, p. 99] concluded that 'we are left with complexity, but few simple answers'. Others have proposed applying agent-structure relationships at both the local and foreign-policy levels [11, Lecours A., p. 92 ]. This too is considered a complex task, as 'this phenomenon is so diverse and intertwined with so many different facets that it is quite difficult to come to terms with from a theoretical point of view' [9, Criekemans D., p. 5]. There seem to be no 'all-inclusive' theoretical approaches to paradiplomacy. More recently, researchers have suggested approaching it within the discipline of political geography, including it within the broad methodological tradition of critical geopolitics and paradiplomacy, and examining it using multi-spatial scales [8, Jackson T., p. 3] . It has been described as 'messy' and a 'contemporary puzzle', in the context of international relations. Analysing and investigating this subject will require multiple approaches and methods [10, Boyer M ., p. 98; 8, Jackson T., p. 3]. To date, the issue has often been placed within the general framework of 'globalisation', as in the present article.
The empirical observations included in this text show that regional substate diplomacy 'negotiates' and finds a policy space within national foreign policy and the domestic-regional context, thus influencing the subnational approach to international activities. This account offers more detailed knowledge of the way in which substate diplomacy is practiced and by whom [9, Criekemans D., p. 5]. Regions, cities, companies, and nongovernmental organisations can cooperate to solve local issues involving trade, investments, collaboration, partnerships, and long-term, sustainable development. They may also raise questions about state-centred systems, international regulations, and the extent to which they place limitations on ambitions and ongoing work. Examples can be found in local discussions about developments in the Norwegian-Russian Barents borderland 25 years after the inauguration of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region. For the last ten years in particular, there has been a focus on the High North areas of Norway and Russia. Periods of intensified bilateral cooperation and complex but integrated governance have been seen on both sides of the border, facilitating people-to-people cooperation in entirely new ways. According to the 
Method: fieldwork, participant observation, and interviews
To address such questions, this paper examines the interplay of factors organised locally and nationally for trans-border purposes, including the development of new borderland networks (borderland conferences) and changes to visa regimes and their consequences (Norway/EURussia); these coexist alongside road and infrastructure improvements (Barents transport and infrastructure networks). Drawing on my training as a social anthropologist, I developed this body of work while living for many years in the Norwegian border town of Kirkenes, which is situated 12 km from Russian border and Murmansk Oblast. As an anthropologist inspired by the fieldwork method, I was able to immerse myself in small-scale local life, engaging with many central arenas during 10-12 years of Norwegian-Russian CBC and region-building approaches. During this period, the Norwegian government launched its High North strategy, increasing the CBC focus. There were many events of general national interest, including delegations of central political authorities visiting the borderland, bilateral meetings between Norwegian and Russian central authorities, international political meetings, new local/regional forums, and the establishment of regional industrial-economic conferences and numerous seminars. In addition to acting as a participant observer at public events, I carried out many open-ended, semi-structured interviews with local politicians, regional authorities, and local stakeholders residing in the Russian Pechenga district and Mur- 
More than just foreign policy
Among its priority areas, the Norwegian High North strategy focused on continuing good relations with Russia, sustainable management of natural resources, energy extraction opportunities in the Barents Sea, climate-change countermeasures, environmental protection, and improved living conditions for the peoples of the north, particularly indigenous cultures. The best way of solving these problems was thought to be: 'more than just foreign policy, and just domestic policy'. 
New foreign policy approaches in the Russian Arctic Schengen borderland
As the Norwegian government was decentralising many High North discussions to its northern communities and the north-eastern border municipality, a parallel process was also tak- In Norway and Russia, the political discourse about this LBT was generally quite optimistic.
In north-east Norway (at local seminars) the visa regime was even seen as paving the way for a total abolition of visas between Norway and Russia (possibly also the rest of Europe, as it is a Schengen-zone border) 7 . Some Norwegian diplomats used the Norwegian-Swedish border regime 
Increased CBC traffic across reorganised borderland space: Transport and infrastructure and the new effects of changing visa regimes
As a result of the BEAR collaboration, the so-called Barents Euro-Arctic Transport Area (BEATA) was conceived. Through multilateral work, a Barents transport plan was launched; it produced solid results and enthusiasm for coordinating the construction of various parts of a much improved BEAR cross-border transport network. 16 The main priority for some time had been Euro- territory up to 30 kilometres from the border. Norwegians can visit specific places within 30-50 kilometres of the border; this area includes the towns of Nikel and Zapolyarny. An LBT is valid for three years and visa holders must have lived in the border zone for more than three years. Thirdcountry inhabitants can also apply for an LBT.
Between the launch of this LBT visa regime in 2012 and April 2017, close to 6,300 Norwegians had received an LBT visa from the Russian Consulate General in Kirkenes. This amounts to 70% of the whole population eligible to apply for a visa. Around 2,000-3,000 Norwegians (40% of all people holding an LBT) use their border-zone visas regularly. According to a survey carried out in 2018 by the present author, of the 60 adolescents between 14-15 years old in Kirkenes, 70%
had visited Russia and 40% held an LBT visa. 19 Overall, 60% visited Russia annually and more than once. 18.3% visited the Russian borderland more than 6 times a year; 58% had participated in sports, culture or municipality cooperation. As this study has attempted to pinpoint details while also sketching in the general picture, the concepts of 'paradiplomacy' and 'regional substate diplomacy' have been useful for studying the processes through which state and substate interactions have facilitated and acted as efficient It is clear that large-and small-scale bilateral discussions are particularly important; despite being framed within regulations and national strategy in the capital, they are operationalised and acted upon by regional and local politicians and stakeholders. Substate diplomacy brings regional expertise to bear on national initiatives to advance regional trans-border matters. As this article points out, recent initiatives on CBC have reactivated and revitalised old forms of post-Cold War approaches to cooperation in important informal 'people-to-people' ways. These endeavours also make an important contribution to the bilateral relationship between Norway and Russia. In a world full of dilemmas and international tension (especially after the Crimea), national state authorities often rely on CBC results in the north, continuing to forecast optimism and stability.
The present study has provided insights into the process through which the 'new North' and its 'multi-layered global governance' were created through small-scale activities at local peripheral sites. The benefits and robustness of this practise of governance are clear only if we study them on-site and on the ground in the High North of the Norwegian-Russian borderland.
Given the extent of geo-economic change on the European and global scene in recent years, it is also fair to conclude that a supportive local and regional ethos remains intact, based as it is in long good traditions for interactions in the borderland, by regional trade, by travel for cul-tural and human contacts and for tourism. The continuity in these activities testifies to the unique tradition of exchange and partnerships at the cross-roads of the European High North.
